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Re: [Phys-L] let's define energy



No need to attack the messenger.

On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 12:10 PM, John Denker <jsd@av8n.com> wrote:

On 09/29/2015 07:39 AM, Paul Nord wrote:

Quoting Rachel Scherr again... "... examples of intuitive ontologies for
energy that we have observed in classroom contexts [... include] energy
as
a quasi-material substance; as a means of activation; as a fuel; and as
an
ineffable quantity which is not subject to further analysis. In the
classroom, multiple and overlapping metaphors for energy complement one
another in complex representations of physical phenomena. "

The problem is, quoting this doesn't help.

I assume it comes from:
[1] Scherr, Close, and McKagan
"Intuitive ontologies for energy in physics"
Proceedings of the 2011 Physics Education Research Conference
http://spu.edu/depts/physics/documents/intuitiveontologies011.pdf


Minor point: Pro tip: If you are going to inflate your article
with bombastic sesquipedalian verbiage, you should look up the
words. You might discover that some of them (e.g. "ontologies")
don't mean what you think they mean. If you skip this step, readers
will think you are lazy, as well as ignorant and pretentious.


Another tip: Don't start the body of the article with a sentence that
is obviously false:
The nature of energy is not typically an explicit topic of physics
instruction.

If it's not a topic at your institution, you should (a) not admit
it, and (b) find someplace else to work, ASAP.

Every introductory textbook I can think of, including the best and
the worst, discusses the nature of energy.

===========

The article [1] identifies a /subset/ of the symptoms, but it does
not identify the root cause of the problem, much less solve it.

A key element of reasoning -- and of useful learning in general --
is /connecting/ one idea with another. This includes checking to see
how each new idea is consistent (or inconsistent!) with previously-
known ideas. This has been understood in the educational psychology
literature for over 100 years that I know of (James, 1898) and possibly
much longer.

I mention this because in ref. [1], the punchline of the abstract is:
The quasi-material substance metaphor best supports
understanding of energy as a conserved quantity.

That doesn't solve the problem, because if somebody is confused
when the DoE asks them to please «conserve energy», telling
them to think in terms of a "quasi-material substance" does not
make them any less confused.

The root of the problem is that words have multiple meanings, always
have, and always will. This has got nothing to do with physics; it
is just how the language works. For example, a lap in the swimming
pool is quantitatively, qualitatively, and conceptually different
from a lap on the race track. Organic chemistry has little to do
with organic vegetables. Context matters. It is foolish to argue
without regard to context that one of the meanings is right and the
others are wrong.

Ref. [1] catalogs a subset of the prevalent meanings, but does not
explain how to reconcile them. A catalog of inconsistencies may be
of some use to an expert, as a first step on the road to finding a
solution, but it's nowhere near a complete solution, and it's of
virtually no value to non-experts.

The conclusion of ref. [1] suggests:
instruction that builds expert concepts from students' everyday
resources and reinforces the beginnings of expert-like thinking
skills as they appear in classroom discourse.

That sounds fine, but this conclusion is utterly unsupported by
the body of the paper. The paper offers no usable guidance on
how to carry out this suggestion ... and offers no evidence that
it actually solves the problem.

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