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Pseudo science



Gary;

I agree a lot with your comment that 'we know it when we see it' -
scientists seem to know how to do science even though we may be hard
pressed to give an precise definition. And I would never argue that
Thagard is the last word on this point.

I think Thagard would say Creationists do pseudo science because
there is a better alternative (evolution theory) which the
creationists want to ignore. And although they are working pretty
hard at it they don't seem to be making much real progress.

Notice that Thagard's definition points at the scientists actions,
not the results. So I don't think Thagard would label Copernicus as
doing pseudo science- he tried out a new idea, his contemporaries
(later Kepler) found the idea fruitful, they abandoned the model
(Copernicus did have epicycles for example) when something better
came along. So even though the theory turned out to be wrong we can
say Copernicus and his contemporaries were doing science (according
to Thagard). We have a little more difficulty saying Tyco Brahe was
doing science since he did not want to give up an older idea but even
there, it was not immediately clear at the time that Copernicus' idea
was going to turn out better so Brahe was justified in working on his
theory; we can say he was doing science.

Likewise Thagard might argue that doing Newtonian mechanics today
would be considered pseudo science IF someone stubbornly refused to
take relativity into account. (Using it in areas where relativity is
not important might be ok.) Certainly Newton himself was doing
science at the time since there was no better alternative.

Popper's falsifiability criterion for science contains an important
point but there are some serious limitations of a naively Popperian
definition of science.
1. For example we almost never discard a theory just because it has
been shown wrong in some cases. It is almost always the case that
theories are held onto and patched with 'ad hoc' additions UNTIL a
better theory comes along.
2. Even then we don't always throw out incorrect theories. We still
teach and use Newtonian mechanics even though we know it is flawed. A
strict Popperian would have us throw it out immediately after
Einstein's 1905 paper showed it was wrong.
3. We seem to test theories in bundles, not one at a time. For
example we assume that the theories of E&M work well enough for us to
build magnets and meters in order to test theories about quarks. It
is very difficult to think about testing 'a' theory, particularly any
modern theory.
4. At what point do we stop testing and put the theory in the text
books? Popper doesn't tell us. How many tests do we have to do?
5. Popper doesn't seem to allow for progress. Theories are either
tentative (untested or partially tested) or wrong. But many incorrect
theories are great frameworks for further development (they are
fruitful, they generate new ideas). Popper seems to want us to close
the books on any theory proven to be flawed and not look back.

kyle

From: Gary Karshner <karshner@STMARYTX.EDU>
Subject: Re: Pseudo science
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2000 14:52:36 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Kyle,
I have a little problem with Thagard's definition of pseudo
science. The
terms progressive and long period of time seem as imprecise as anything
I
would label pseudo science. Is Newtonian mechanics or electrostatics
pseudo
sciences? They seem to fit his definitions and creationism is not one
since
there is a tremendous little industry out in California churning out
papers
trying to explain the world in those terms.
I think Popper's testability is far more workable as it falls
back to our
Galilean roots, but it is the outcomes of those tests that is important.
I think we are all starting out like the congressman on pornography ("I
know it when I see it."), and like many philosophical discussions trying
to
define it after the fact.
Thagard's second test would have been failed by Copernicus since
he had to
abandon Aristotelian Physics along with astronomy. Aristotle argued that
the earth could not move since there would be great winds caused by its
motion. A point Copernicus ignores and Tycho tried to address with his
model. Often in science we have to start over to make progress and by
this
definition change it into pseudo science!

Gary

-----------------------------------------------------
kyle forinash 812-941-2390
kforinas@ius.edu
Natural Science Division
Indiana University Southeast
New Albany, IN 47150
http://Physics.ius.edu/
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