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I'll not copy John Clement's posting, but I have difficulty
harmonizing his conclusions with data presented in Case and Edelstein,
Ed., <The New Structuralizm in Cognitive Deevelopment> (Karger 1993).
In a chapter discussing reactions to Piaget theory, Case, Okamoto,
Henderson and MCKeough write:
_________________________________________________________________
In support of this view [one different from Piaget's], a variety
of experimental data were gathered. In the present context, the
most important were those showing (a) insignificant correlations between
developmental tests that Piaget had claimed tapped the same underlying
logical structure; {b} substantial asynchrony in the rate of development
of concepts that Piaget had claimed depend on the same underlying
structure; (c)strong training effects on logical tasks such as
conservation, which were supposedly dependent on the gradual emergence of
a general developmental structure; and (d) transfer from such training to
other tasks having the same conceptual content (e.g., different forms of
conservation), but not to other concepts that were supposeed to depend on
the same underlying stucture (e.g., classification or class inclusion).
______________________________________________________________________
My impression is that these latter authors are writing much later
than Karplus and Lawson and were aware of K&L's work (although not cited
in this volume). The book includes table showing experimantal results.
This is certainly evidence that one of Piaget's conclusions was wrong. Some
of this evidence was published in JRST. Now as to this always being true,
there are certain tasks that are correlated with each other, but others
which are not. So the idea of substantial synchrony is certainly
questionable.
Now as to the strong training effects, Piaget acknowledged that these tasks
were trainable, but did so by pointing out that they were dependent on
cultural conditions. He did not try to train students, just observe them.
He might be characterized as being an anthropologiist of the mind.
My point is that he identified the markers of thinking which are necessary
to be able to handle many higher level tasks which are required in math and
science. The research which I have read points to success in other subjects
when these specific thinking skills are targeted. But, the early methods
for targeting these skills explicitly taught the Piagetian tasks and had a
low success rate in improving overall student performance. The methods such
as Shayer and Adey which use Piaget's ideas for development have been very
successful. I have evidence that the Piagetian tests form a good indicator
of necessary, but not sufficient conditions for high gain on the FCI/FMCE.
When all this is said there are some things which are correlated with
physical development. Lawson has shown that the brain development that
occurs at age 10+ is probably a requirement for the student to develop the
ability to test at the formal operational level. Shayer & Adey's program
works very well at 10+ and pushes student to test at that level as well as
having a large delayed gain on conventional tests. But the same program
given prior to this age only raises student thinking to the upper end of the
concrete operational level. So in a sense the strict level theory has some
validity, but not in the exact form hypothesized by Piaget.
Philip Adey pointed out in a talk that one needs to hit the students with
the necessary thinking tasks at the precise points where there is a window
of opportunity of rapid brain growth. That is precisely what their program
does at 10+. He said that rather than concentrating on HS they should
target the beginning of formal schooling where there is another window of
opportunity. They have done some experiments reported in their latest book
"Learning Intelligence". There is also possibly another window around the
senior year in HS, and maybe one around age 24-26.
One of the dreadful parts of this is that students are usually subject to
increasing rote learning during these windows, rather than being given
thinking tasks. Middle school appears to be a waste, partially because the
lecture system is often introduced heavily at exactly the wrong time.
The quote also implies that training in the Piagetian tasks has little far
transfer, which is probably true when the tasks are explicitly taught.
Indeed most didactic teaching produces little far or near transfer.
Students neither can handle similar but different tasks let alone extremely
different tasks. However there is evidence for far transfer in the Shayer &
Adey's methods. There is even more evidence for far transfer in
Feuerstein's methods which use no recognizable curriculum material to
substantially raise student thinking. Feuerstein can also show a large rise
on general IQ tests. All of these training methods are consistent with the
idea that this type of learning is developmental, or gradual over time.
I have on a number of occasions talked about students testing at a certain
level, which does not imply buying into the theory of deeper underlying
structures. The real value of Piaget is that he was the first to identify
and classify many of the tasks which form the basis of thinking. Certainly
newer interpretations will come along, but the wealth of his data forms a
basis for the newer ideas. He also was an acute observer of how children
learn, much the way Margaret Meade observed Polynesians. The other value is
that his ideas are just now (starting in the 80s!) being profitably used to
improve education.
Part of the debate is about trying to tear down his ideas so that devotees
of didactic methods can validate the transmissivist model of education. As
PER has shown pure didactic methods do not work well. The paradigm that
students construct their own understanding is absolutely correct. But,
understanding can be constructed from a variety of sources, including some
didactic sources. The idea that one can dictate what students should learn
independently of what they currently understand is also bankrupt and
immoral.
My object in bringing up Piaget is to get people thinking about the fact
that students are low on a Piagetian scale which means that they do not have
the requisite thinking for full success in science and math. From what I
can see these basic habits of thinking are not being targeted very well in
most curricula. Arons pointed to them as being necessary, so why can't we
have curricula which target these ideas in an organized fashion.
As an example, my son is taking a college physics course (which is
wretchedly taught), and the first chapter of the book has a few scaling
tasks such as how does the volume change when you increase all dimensions by
a factor of 10. How does the absorption of nutrients through the skin
change? Now while these are certainly worthwhile, they will not by
themselves substantially raise student thinking in just one homework. The
students who test formal operational will readily understand them, and the
others will not.
Bringing up college physics also brings up the issue of who teaches the
courses and how well are they taught. So far my son has had 2 instructors
at U. of Houston and both are dreadful. He dropped the first course because
nobody in the class could understand a word the instructor said. The
current one is understandable, but all he does is write equations on the
board. Incidentally a former student had a physics instructor like that at
TX A&M, so he avoided class and got through by studying the book. It is
unconscionable for universities to take student money and then provide
obviously inferior instruction. HS does it too, but they at least try to
give the appearance of having good instruction.
John M. Clement
Houston, TX