Re: Experimental verification of the relativity theory

[Pentcho Valev <pvalev@BAS.BG>]

John Mallinckrodt wrote:

> Pentcho offers a valuable parable from the history of thermodynamics
> which, in essence, is a nice illustration that one cannot use the
> true statement, A => B, to reach any conclusion about the truth of
> its converse, B => A.
>
> That is precisely why I was so careful to say that the spectacular
> agreement of the predictions of special relativity with every
> experiment that has been
> performed "give us such enormous confidence in" (rather than "prove")
> the primary postulate.
>
> There is a critically  important aesthetic aspect of science at work
> here.  We NEVER "prove" ANYTHING about WHY the real world does what
> it does in an experimental science like physics.  Instead, we seek
> "simple" models of reality that have "wide ranges of applicability"
> and that make new, hopefully counterintuitive or previously
> unsuspected predictions.   Thus, the attractiveness of a premise is
> in some direct proportion to 1) its simplicity, 2) the range of
> physical phenomena it "explains", and 3) the degree to which its
> validated predictions run counter to our previous intuitions.
>
> Judged by these criteria, the primary premise of special relativity
> looks like a very serious winner!

Let me disagree. We have in fact two initial premises (axioms) and the
alleged corollary, Lorentz equations. In which cases the corollary is NOT
really a corollary and if it is not, what are the implications? An
obvious case is one in which there is another (third) initial premise
which has remained hidden for some reason. Carnot argument did involve
such a premise - it was

The machine would work only in the presence of an operator - someone who
at least switches it on or off and unavoidably undergoes changes (e.g.
biochemical changes in the brain) in the process.

Of course, Carnot did not hide the premise - rather, it was so obvious
that it would have been too tedious to spell it out. (In logic such
premises are called "suppressed"). Still it was equipollent to the other
two and by ignoring it, Clausius and Kelvin did what they did. In any
case, we can say that, in a strict sense, Carnot conclusion is NOT a
corollary of the two explicit premises, but it IS a corollary of the
three premises including the suppressed one.
Likewise, since some time ago we found a third premise in the relativity
theory (Ken called it "wild"), Lorentz equations are NOT a corollary of
Einstein's two initial premises. The implication is that experimental
verification of Lorentz equations can tell us nothing about the two
axioms.
Lorentz equations are not a corollary of the two axioms not only because
there is a third axiom - there are other logical flaws. I would like to
call the attention to the fact that, in a deductive theory, experimental
verification has only minor importance. 95% of the importance should be
attributed to the validity of the arguments, and here the situation is
deplorable. Apart from the problem you raise at the beginning of your
text above, there are countless others. Nobody seems to know the
relations between the statements "if...then....",  "if and only if...
then....",  "A if a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for B",  "A
is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for B" etc. etc. And these
are only the elementary aplications of logic in physical sciences - in a
deductive theory, the logical complexity is much greater.

Pentcho