John Denker wrote, in part:
"Causes ought to precede effects."
John and I argued before about whether cause necessarily implies
precedence. It seems that we will have to continue to agree to disagree
on this point.
"Consider a turntable, rotating uniformly. A puck sits on the
turntable. I can measure the mass (m) of the puck, and I can measure
the force (F) required to hold the puck in position relative to the
turntable ... but it would be perverse to suggest that the acceleration
(a) is _caused_ by F/m."
It is not perverse, and I will continue to state that the force on the
puck causes it to accelerate. I can control how much force is applied
to the puck without changing any properties of the puck by changing the
properties of the surface of the turntable. Therefore, it would be
perverse to suggest that the force is caused by the acceleration of the
puck. On the other hand, because I can change the acceleration of the
puck by changing the force, it logically follows that the force causes
the acceleration of the puck.
Daniel Crowe
Oklahoma School of Science and Mathematics
Ardmore Regional Center
dcrowe@sotc.org