There are three cases:
*) Clearly it's bad if effects precede causes.
*) Clearly it's good if causes precede effects.
*) The marginal case -- where causes are exactly
contemporaneous eith effects -- is a bit of an odd
duck. It's like the parallel postulate: you can
assume it or assume the opposite, and get two
different geometries.
> I'm still waiting for
> someone to provide evidence that the word
> "cause" necessarily implies precedence.
The meaning of words is established by convention.
The folks who have thought most about causation are
the epidemiologists, and they take it as axiomatic
that causes precede effects.
I prefer this definition. I recommend this definition.
I have never seen a case where this definition got
anybody into trouble.
Subject to this definition, F does not cause ma,
and ma does not cause F.
I am willing to tolerate a variant definition that
allows effects to be contemporaneous with causes.
I don't like this, and I don't recommend it, but I
will tolerate it at least long enough to discuss it.
Subject to this variant assumption, it is OK to say
that F causes ma *provided* you also say that ma
causes F. I have never seen any advantage to this,
but maybe one will turn up someday.
There is *no* definition of cause-and-effect that allows
one to logically say that F causes ma and not vice versa.
For details see http://www.av8n.com/physics/causation.htm