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[[did Kalman mean: (a) between the human
sciences (psychology, social sciences, and education) using the
Harvard serial comma as advised by the American Institute of Physics
Style Manual, (b) "between the human sciences (psychology, social
sciences) and education"; (c) "between the human sciences
(psychology, social sciences, and education) and natural science";
(d) some other; (e) none of the above. ??]]. . . .
(c) "between the human sciences
(psychology, social sciences, and education) and natural science";
Jürgen Habermas emphasized that the hermeneutic circle view, must involve critical judgment and reflection.
Mary Hesse accepts Jürgen Habermas proposition that science cannot be considered as neutral imquiry. But unlike Habermas, she feels that hermeneutics has a role to play in all the sciences:
It is convenient to take as starting - point a perceptive discussion by Jurgen Habermas of similarities and differences between empirical and hermeneutic method in his book published in English as Knowledge and Human Interests. I shall consider first a group of distinctions concerning traditional problems of the language and epistemology of science taken from his exposition of Wilhelm Dilthey. These are distinctions that I believe are made largely untenable by recent more accurate analyses of natural science. (Hesse, 1980, p. 169)
There follows a detailed description of five points . Mary Hesse’s feeling is that the distinctions that Habermas was making are based on the instrumentalist perspective promoted by the Vienna circle prior to World War 1:
What is immediately striking to readers versed in recent literature in philosophy of science is that almost every point made about the human sciences has recently been made about the natural sciences, and that the five points made about the natural sciences presupposes a traditional empiricist view of natural science that is almost universally discredited. In this traditional view it is assumed that the sole basis of scientific knowledge is the given in experience, that descriptions of this given are available in a theory- independent and stable language, whether of sense data or of common sense observations, that theories make no ontological claims about the rewal world except in so far as they are reducible to mere external correlations of observables. It is no novelty that all these empiricist theses have been subject to much philosophic controversy. It has been accepted since Kant that experience is partly constituted by theoretical categories, and more recently than Kant it has generally that these categories are not a priori, but are conjectured by creative imagination, having a mental source different from experiential stimuli. Moreover the work of Wittgenstein, Quine, Kuhn, Feyerabend and others has in various ways made it apparent that the descriptive language of observables is ‘theory-laden’, that is to say, in every empirical assertion that can be used as a starting-point of scientific investigation and theory, we employ concepts that interpret the data in terms of some general view of the world or other, and this is true however rooted in ‘ordinary language’ the concepts are. There are no stable observational descriptions, whether of sense data, or protocol sentences, in which the empirical reference of science can be directly captured.Hesse, M.: 1980. Revolutions & reconstructions in the philosophy of science Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, USA.
…
It follows, so it is held, that the logic of science is necessarily circular: data are interpreted and sometimes corrected by coherence with theory, and, at least in less extreme versions of the account, theory is also somehow constrained by empirical data.. (Hesse, 1980, pp. 171, 172)
In response to my post "Re: Physicist Steven Weinberg's Essay
'AGAINST PHILOSOPHY'"[Hake (2012)], physicist Calvin Kalman (2012)
wrote [bracketed by lines "KKKKK. . . ."; slightly edited so as to
place *academic* references in the REFERENCE list at the end of this
post; my insert at ". . . . [[insert]]. . . . .":
KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
I am afraid that Richard Hake has no idea about hermeneutics. . . .
[[And I'm afraid that Calvin Kalman has no idea of the weaknesses of
hermeneutic analyses as cogently set forth by philosopher Denis
Phillips (2000) in Chapter 2 "Hermeneutics and Naturalistic Social
Inquiry" of "Expanded Social Scientist's Bestiary: A Guide to Fabled
Threats to, and Defenses of, Naturalistic Social Science," a small
part of which was included in my *complete* post (Hake, 2012 at
<http://bit.ly/xupPFH> (probably either unread or dismissed by
Kalman)]]. . . . . Although the subject originated in bible study,
it has come a long way since then. The modern theory of hermeneutics
developed by Gadamer (1977)]. . . . .
[[<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Georg_Gadamer>]]. . . .
based upon notions put forth by his teacher Heidegger. . . . .
[[<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heidegger>]]. . . . .
Gadamer argued that it is through language that the world is opened
up for us. Weinberg's point and Gale's and Wittgenstein's have
nothing to do with science educational research. Indeed Gadamer would
agree with them. He felt that hemeneutics actually provided a
demarcation between the human sciences (psychology, social sciences
and education). . . .[[did Kalman mean: (a) between the human
sciences (psychology, social sciences, and education) using the
Harvard serial comma as advised by the American Institute of Physics
Style Manual, (b) "between the human sciences (psychology, social
sciences) and education"; (c) "between the human sciences
(psychology, social sciences, and education) and natural science";
(d) some other; (e) none of the above. ??]]. . . .
The physicist who wrote the most on Hermeneutics and science
education is Martin Eger (deceased). . . . . All of his articles are
reprinted in "Science, Understanding, and Justice: The Philosophical
Essays of Martin Eger" [Eger (2006)]. I reprinted one of his articles
in my book "Successful Science and Engineering Teaching: Theoretical
and Learning Perspectives" [Kalman (2008)].
Eger argued that hermeneutics was an ideal tool in science education.
Indeed I have made use of hermeneutics as particularly described in
two articles.
KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK
Although it may be true that Gadamer would agree with Weinberg, Gale,
and Wittgenstein that philosophy is of marginal interest to
contemporary practicing scientists, it would appear that Eger might
not.
…
Richard Hake, Emeritus Professor of Physics, Indiana University
Honorary Member, Curmudgeon Lodge of Deventer, The Netherlands
President, PEdants for Definitive Academic References
which Recognize the Invention of the Internet (PEDARRII)
<rrhake@earthlink.net>
Links to Articles: <http://bit.ly/a6M5y0>
Links to SDI Labs: <http://bit.ly/9nGd3M>
Blog: <http://bit.ly/9yGsXh>
Academia: <http://iub.academia.edu/RichardHake>\
Twitter <https://twitter.com/#!/rrhake>