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[Phys-l] Fwd: Weight vs mass



Here is the third response on the history of weight vs mass...you may need some French.

joe

Joseph J. Bellina, Jr. Ph.D.
Professor of Physics
Saint Mary's College
Notre Dame, IN 46556

Begin forwarded message:

From: Georges Moyal <Moyal@glendon.yorku.ca>
Date: October 24, 2006 10:11:10 AM EDT
To: Joseph Bellina <jbellina@SAINTMARYS.EDU>
Subject: Weight vs mass

Dear Profesor Bellina,

Sorry for being somewhat late in answering your query.
There are a number of passages in Descartes which show that he views weight
as what Locke would call "secondary qualities" (like colour, smell, etc.) :
in one passage he maintains that it is a "relative" property, by which he
means that a body acquires weight only by being in the presence of another
body; it is not an inherent property of it as its size, shape, etc. would
be. I have pasted the following passages culled from the Ch. Adam & P.
Tannery ("AT") edition of his works (the standard reference). They are in
French, but the references should help you (or your colleague) through
available translations in English. I am not sure, however, that one would
find the notion of mass in Descartes; he may well have been content with
that of size instead.
I hope this is of some help.
Incidentally, I am also not sure whether he is the first to have held this
position: Galileo (who holds similar views on secondary qualities and
might well include weight among them) may be worth having a look at.

1.À Mersenne [?] automne 1635 (AT I, 324) : « ?je ne crois point non plus
que les corps pesants descendent par quelque qualité réelle, nommée
pesanteur, telle que les philosophes l'imaginent, ni aussi par quelque
attraction de la terre ; »
Cf. Principes IV, art. 202 et Corresp. AT IV, 716.

2. Corresp. À ***** (sans date ; AT IV, 716) : « Défiez-vous de deux
préjugés, à savoir qu'il peut y avoir du vide, et que la force qui fait
qu'une pierre tend en bas, qu'on nomme sa pesanteur, demeure toujours égale
dans la pierre ; qui sont choses qu'on imagine communément comme
véritables, quoiqu'elles soient très fausses. »
Cf. Principes IV, art. 202 et Corresp. AT I, 324.

3. Principes IV, 202 (AT XI, 320) : « ?il [Arist.] leur attribuait de la
pesanteur, et moi je nie qu'il y en ait en aucun corps, en tant qu'il est
considéré seul, pour ce que c'est une qualité qui dépend du mutuel rapport
que plusieurs corps ont les uns aux autres? »
Cf. Corresp. AT I, 324 et IV, 716.

Georges J. D. Moyal
c/o Dept of Philosophy,
Glendon College / York University,
2275, Bayview Ave.,
Toronto, Ont., M4N 3M6
Canada