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From: Georges Moyal <Moyal@glendon.yorku.ca>
Date: October 24, 2006 10:11:10 AM EDT
To: Joseph Bellina <jbellina@SAINTMARYS.EDU>
Subject: Weight vs mass
Dear Profesor Bellina,
Sorry for being somewhat late in answering your query.
There are a number of passages in Descartes which show that he views weight
as what Locke would call "secondary qualities" (like colour, smell, etc.) :
in one passage he maintains that it is a "relative" property, by which he
means that a body acquires weight only by being in the presence of another
body; it is not an inherent property of it as its size, shape, etc. would
be. I have pasted the following passages culled from the Ch. Adam & P.
Tannery ("AT") edition of his works (the standard reference). They are in
French, but the references should help you (or your colleague) through
available translations in English. I am not sure, however, that one would
find the notion of mass in Descartes; he may well have been content with
that of size instead.
I hope this is of some help.
Incidentally, I am also not sure whether he is the first to have held this
position: Galileo (who holds similar views on secondary qualities and
might well include weight among them) may be worth having a look at.
1.À Mersenne [?] automne 1635 (AT I, 324) : « ?je ne crois point non plus
que les corps pesants descendent par quelque qualité réelle, nommée
pesanteur, telle que les philosophes l'imaginent, ni aussi par quelque
attraction de la terre ; »
Cf. Principes IV, art. 202 et Corresp. AT IV, 716.
2. Corresp. À ***** (sans date ; AT IV, 716) : « Défiez-vous de deux
préjugés, à savoir qu'il peut y avoir du vide, et que la force qui fait
qu'une pierre tend en bas, qu'on nomme sa pesanteur, demeure toujours égale
dans la pierre ; qui sont choses qu'on imagine communément comme
véritables, quoiqu'elles soient très fausses. »
Cf. Principes IV, art. 202 et Corresp. AT I, 324.
3. Principes IV, 202 (AT XI, 320) : « ?il [Arist.] leur attribuait de la
pesanteur, et moi je nie qu'il y en ait en aucun corps, en tant qu'il est
considéré seul, pour ce que c'est une qualité qui dépend du mutuel rapport
que plusieurs corps ont les uns aux autres? »
Cf. Corresp. AT I, 324 et IV, 716.
Georges J. D. Moyal
c/o Dept of Philosophy,
Glendon College / York University,
2275, Bayview Ave.,
Toronto, Ont., M4N 3M6
Canada