Re: "non-transfer" of energy

[Bernard Cleyet <anngeorg@PACBELL.NET>]

I attempt to relate naive reality to enlightened reality.  A naive viewer sees
objects and ascribes a physical reality to them, while an enlightened one sees
properties that are only perceptions.  I, presently, find it convenient to give
persistent properties a different reality.  i.e. as being due to objects (bodies).
Transient properties, no less real, are not objects alone.  It is for this reason
that I don't consider heat as a substance, and therefor, can not flow. I think this
"half way" point between everything, property - perception and all is "real"
substance in nature, is useful heuristically.  Once one is "very" enlightened; e.g.
is familiar with the microscopic nature of how, with kinetic theory and thermo.
statistics, a hot object and a cold may come into equilibrium at an intermediate
temperature; it may be useful to think of energy flowing.  To tell students that heat
is a substance works as far as solving many "Physics teaching" problems, but leaves
them with, I think, an incomplete view of reality.

bc who, a Berkelian and devout atheist, is not even certain of his naive existence




Bob Sciamanda wrote:

> David Bowman wrote:
> |" What is physical reality other than a collection of
> | physical properties that happen to exist?"
>
> I think this goes to the heart of the matter.  Operationally, an electron
> is nothing more than the sum of its properties.  How else to define
> anything except in terms of its properties? - that is what it IS.  What is
> left to the concept "electron" after you have removed all of its
> properties?
>
> This, I think is in contrast to our (Aristotelian) intuition.
> Aristotelians (and the Scholastics) distinguished the "essence" of a thing
> from its properties ("substance" vs "accidents") - I don't think this is
> operationally valid, although it is intuitively natural.  Thus, this
> distinction never directly enters into our calculational models, but we do
> fruitfully use this distinction in our speaking and in our conceptual
> models.  Our conceptual Physics is in the language of humans and is a
> metaphor of the described reality.
>
> Within the scope of testable Physics, It is fruitless to argue about
> "substance" vs "accident" or which properties can /should be reified.
>
> Bob Sciamanda (W3NLV)
> Physics, Edinboro Univ of PA (em)
> trebor@velocity.net
> http://www.velocity.net/~trebor

This posting is the position of the writer, not that of SUNY-BSC, NAU or the AAPT.