Re: The "two child solution"

[Leigh Palmer <palmer@sfu.ca>]

> Regarding the philosophical objections about the probability of
> after-the-fact events, I think such objections may be allayed by a simple
> rewording of the question so it refers to potential events instead of those
> which have already happened.  Also, such objections lose their force anyway if
> only a more Bayesian interpretation of the probabilities involved is used
> (which I prefer, BTW).  After all, the whole point of the problem is to
> illustrate the effect of how conditional probabilities depend on additional
> information.

A rephrased problem in this case is a different problem. That was already
pointed out. The original problem is ill-posed and is a proper object for
Bayesian calculation, but that was not done. Indeed I doubt this "clever"
person knows anything about it.

Leigh